Knowledge Management Failures as Latent Safety Risks in Aviation Organizations
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62477/eeq3gx33Keywords:
knowledge management, transport management, safety governance, aviation safety, latent conditions, organizational learning, safety management systems, high reliability organisationsAbstract
Aviation safety has achieved remarkable performance improvements over recent decades, yet accident investigations continue to reveal organizational vulnerabilities that are not easily explained by technical failure or procedural non–compliance alone. Safety research has long emphasized the role of latent organizational conditions in accident causation, but the contribution of Knowledge Management (KM) to these conditions remains insufficiently examined. This paper addresses this gap by conceptualizing KM failures as a distinct class of latent safety risks in aviation organizations. Drawing on safety science, organizational learning theory, and KM literature, the paper develops a conceptual framework that explains how degraded knowledge processes gradually weaken multiple layers of safety defense. The paper is conceptual and theory–building in nature, offering a mechanism–based account of how KM–related breakdowns operate as upstream, latent conditions in aviation safety. Four interrelated failure modes are identified: fragmentation of safety–relevant knowledge, erosion of tacit expertise, deficient organizational learning loops, and impaired sensemaking. It synthesizes these failure modes into an integrative framework and advances a set of propositions intended to support subsequent empirical testing. These failures tend to accumulate over time, often remaining invisible to conventional safety indicators, while reducing organizational resilience and increasing dependence on individual vigilance. The framework reframes safety as an emergent organizational capability rooted in how knowledge is created, integrated, and interpreted. On this basis, it positions knowledge degradation as a distinct latent safety mechanism and treats KM as a core structural element of aviation safety systems rather than a peripheral managerial activity. The paper translates the framework into propositions to guide empirical research and provides a basis for safety managers and oversight bodies to identify, assess, and govern KM–related latent risk, particularly where operational complexity and data abundance can obscure gradual erosion in learning and sensemaking.